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of research has furnished cultural theorists with concepts and theories for animating
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to a pre-positivist analytics of experimentation found within early psychology. When
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stake in such strategies of appropriation and re-invention.
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Introduction: Affect as Critique and Counter-Critique
This article is a response to an increasing rapprochement taking place
between the humanities and the sciences, and specifically between cultural
theory and the psychological sciences. The focus of the article will be on the
nature of some of the reparative readings (Sedgwick and Frank, 1995) that
are being made within the field of affect studies. These have formed the basis
of a range of critiques and counter-critiques (see Leys, 2011; Wetherell, 2012
for example). It is written from the perspective of somebody who has spent
the last 20 years working within the field of media and cultural studies, but
whose intellectual formation originated initially within psychology and
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particularly its feminist, discursive and critical instantiations. The focus of the
article will be on the area of automaticity research within cognitive science as it
intersects with experimental social psychology discussing some of the field’s past
and present formations. This controversial tradition of research has also
furnished cultural theorists with concepts and theories for animating affect and
therefore provides a fruitful intersection for interdisciplinary enquiry. The article
will identify some of the trends within affect studies and offers a strategy of
incorporating psychology into debates on affect that returns to a pre-positivist
analytics of experimentation found within early psychology. When this analytics
is brought into dialogue with science and technology studies (STS) and per-
formative approaches to experimentation (Barad, 2007), the problematic of
subjectivity is not displaced or elided as is often claimed, but rather becomes a
central recurring issue. The article will therefore bridge debates within cultural
theory and long-standing debates on the problematic of subjectivity represented
in the pages of this journal. It will explore what might be at stake in such
strategies of appropriation and re-invention.
Affect studies is a contemporary field of debate that offers the potential for
interdisciplinary dialogue and the invention of new methods, modes of experi-
mentation and theorising across the arts, humanities and the sciences. It has in part
been shaped by the voices of key interlocuters who have helped to establish
particular orientations, concepts and ontological assumptions about what affect is
or does and indeed could become. One key debate that has shaped a specific series
of reflections has been initiated by the contributions and interventions of the
historian of science, Leys (2011). As a historian Leys (ibid.) has critically reviewed
some of the theories, concepts, debates and ontological assumptions that some
humanities scholars have made about affect. Her focus is specifically the trend
towards engaging the neuroscience of affect and emotion across the humanities,
and specifically those concepts, theories and theorists which exemplify and to
whom she suggests, ‘go most directly to the heart of what is at stake in the general
turn to affect’ (p. 435). The question of ‘what is at stake’ in such rapprochement
with science, by the humanities, is her key concern and one shared by others also
more critically immersed within the neuroscience of affect and emotion (see
Wetherell, 2012). What is missed, Leys, Wetherell and others such as Papoulias
and Callard (2010) argue, are the complex circuits of contestation, argumentation,
verification and authorisation, which surround the theories, explanatory concepts
and forms of experimentation that have shaped and continue to shape this area.
Leys’ main focus is on the status of non-intentionality or what is often described
as the non-cognitive within some accounts of affect. As Leys suggests, the
psychological sciences are one knowledge practice, which has provided humanities
theorists with a variety of concepts and theories for ways of theorising affect as
non-cognitive process. One figure who has formed a focus for debate and become
central to many accounts of affectivity is the work and theories of the American
psychologist Silvan Tomkins (see Frank and Wilson, 2012; Wetherell, 2012).
Affect and automaticy
363© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 7, 4, 362–384
As readers who are familiar with these debates will know, Tomkins’ theories and
his re-articulation within the present, have opened up a series of contentions,
controversies and conversations regarding the materiality and neo-materiality of
those forces, motivations, desires, habits and instincts that might guide beha-
viour, thought and feeling. In part these debates offer an alternative to what is
seen as an over-preoccupation with psychoanalysis within cultural theory as a
way of theorising how power operates to produce and shape affects and desires
(see Grusin, 2010).
What such dialogues disclose are the parameters of what currently circulates
and is enacted via the affective turn and its distinctive markers and character-
istics. These have been rehearsed by many, which include for the purposes of this
article, a critical re-appraisal of the sciences (and particularly the psychological
and neurosciences) by the humanities; a critical and creative re-engagement with
ontological as opposed to epistemological concerns; a grounding of what might
have passed as immaterial within a neo-materialist reading of what a body is
capable of doing, and to that end a radical re-conceptualisation of embodiment,
often beyond a distinctly singular, phenomenologically experiencing human
subject. Of course these concerns have pre-histories that affect acts as an attractor
for and pick up on more longstanding debates surrounding power, agency,
subjectivity and biopolitics; and how to invent methodological and conceptual
apparatuses that allow a purchase on the question of power, subjectification and
the complex problematic of subjectivity (see Blackman et al, 2008). This is often
but not always set within a de-stabilization of what it means to communicate
beyond the context of (human) talk, discourse and conversation. This includes an
exploration of theories that are sensitive to non-human agencies, entanglements
and thresholds, which confound and unsettle humanist and sometimes post-
humanist beliefs and sentiments (see Clough, 2008; Seigworth and Gregg, 2010).
Networked Virality and Reparative Reading
This article will be situated within the increasing attention given to concepts such
as contagion, suggestion and automaticity for animating affective processes.
Within the humanities contagion, suggestion and automaticity in different ways
are considered useful and productive figures to account for non-linear, distrib-
uted processes of movement, change and transformation.1 The paradoxes that
govern discussions of network culture, for example, ask how and why do certain
contagions spread and intensify across social and digital media. This problem is
seen by some to be usefully addressed by turning to theories of suggestion,
imitation and automaticity found within experimental social psychology, and the
cognitive sciences. One recent book, which explicitly draws on such theories and
concepts to explore the virality or viral logic of network culture is a book by the
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cultural theorist, Sampson (2012), Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of
Networks. He argues that contagion and theories of imitation found within the
past and present of experimental social psychology and the neurosciences might
provide important heuristics for re-thinking communication processes beyond
the human, singularly bounded, cognitive subject. This is an attempt to grasp
what is termed a ‘contagious relationality’ (p. 3), which he relates specifically to
biopolitical strategies in the present that are taken to work pre-emptively.
Sampson suggests that pre-emption tendencies attempt to modulate and exploit
emotion and affect, as well as to ‘affectively prime social atmospheres, creating
the conditions for increasingly connected populations to pass on and imitate the
suggestions of others’ (p. 5; also see Massumi, 2009). Sampson draws a lineage
with the concerns of nineteenth and early twentieth psychologists and sociolo-
gists and specifically with the potentially unconscious, instinctual or even
affective bases of contagion (also see Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001; Reicher,
2001; Blackman, 2012; Borch, 2012). These theories of the crowd, imitation and
suggestion are brought into dialogue with explicitly contemporary concerns; with
how communication is intensified and spreads within networked populations.
The question for Sampson, as with many others, is exactly what does spread?
Clearly not just information as understood within traditional media theory, or
cybernetics, as what spreads includes political rumours, fads, fashions, trends,
gossip, hype, emotions, feelings, affects, sensations and moods, for example;
forms of contagious communication that as many people have argued, take us
back to the nineteenth century concerns and potentially to those theorists, such as
Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, whose interests in contagion underpinned
their own models of sociality (see Blackman, 2012).
Sampson announces the present as an ‘age of contagion’ (p. 1), and brings the
past, primarily the French micro-sociologist and criminologist Gabriel Tarde’s
work2 – decribed as ‘Tarde’s imitation-suggestion thesis’ (p. 13) – into dialogue
with contemporary neuromarketing and post-WWII experimental social psychol-
ogy (specifically the work of Stanley Milgram and his famous obedience
experiments). In different ways all these theories and experimental practices are
seen to potentially explain, animate, articulate, dramatise, make visible and allow
a purchase on the modulation of processes which exist, below, beyond and to the
side of cognition (see Protevi, 2009). These processes are taken to reveal our
fundamental relationality with others – human and non-human. On this basis,
Sampson argues for a ‘revised notion of subjectivity’ based on a refiguring of
Tarde’s ‘sonambulistic subjectivity’ embedded within ‘technological network
relations’ (p. 13). Tarde’s sonambulism relates to his oft-quoted assumption that
suggestion rather than rationality or reason are the basis of sociality, disclosing
his interest in hypnotic suggestion and contagious forms of communication (see
Blackman, 2007).
Sampson’s reading is a complex one that mines early and contemporary
psychology, micro-sociology and the cognitive and affective neurosciences for
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those theories, which are taken to articulate some of the complexity of contagious
processes. He draws primarily on theories, experiments and theorists who are
more known outside of psychology (Milgram, for example) and does not remain
faithful or attentive to the nuance of critique, debate and argumentation which
Milgram’s tradition is part of. Sampson’s approach has similarities with
Massumi’s (2002) strategy of ‘creative contagion’, where theories, concepts,
ideas and experimental practices are taken out of one context and put into
another. This method of refraction – reading psychology and the neurosciences
through philosophy and cultural theory – for example, is designed to open up
new thinking (refraction has some similarities to Donna Haraway’s method of
diffractive reading). The inventiveness of this strategy is not designed to operate
according to a positivist ethics (the world is like this) but rather as a performative
opening; ‘What if one conceived the world in this way?’ (Gibbs, 2010, p. 189).
Philosophers have long engaged this practice in order to create wonder, and to
enable the present to be seen as a process of becoming rather than the natural
and inevitable outcome of historical processes. Deleuze (1992) has re-staged
Spinoza’s philosophical writings on ethics in order to re-figure the body as a
process, rather than a substance or essence. Latour (2002) has re-staged the work
of Gabriel Tarde in order to inject psychic energy into social processes, and
Massumi (2002) has re-staged the writings of William James, in order to make
visible the limits of science’s ability to theorise affect, passion and emotion.
Similarly, Sampson refracts contagion theory through a Deleuzian ‘topographical
diagrammatics’ (p. 3) in order to extend the relationality and intersubjectivity of
contagion theory beyond the distinctly human.
Many inspired by affect and its twists and turns have foregrounded related
concepts such as the subliminal, the contagious and automaticity to reframe
power as working affectively, in ways which by-pass conscious, rational attention.
These approaches are often described as vitalist and appear across many
debates within cultural theory. This includes the re-invigoration of power within
understandings of networked cultures, mediation, cognitive capitalisms and pre-
emptive strategies of control where power is seen to ‘get under the skin’ in ways
which exceed cognition and the self-regulating capacities of distinctly human
subjects. The use of the term subliminal in much work on affect relates to a more
hypnotic modality of power, often described as non-representational (see Thrift,
2007) – or in a related context as operating with a technological un- or non-
conscious (see Grusin, 2010; Sampson, 2012). These terms relate to those
processes which are seen to operate below the threshold of conscious attention
and awareness and which become the target and object of strategies of power and
regulation. A key question for many humanities scholars is what engaging with
the sciences might furnish in terms of our understanding of such vitalist or
affective processes.
The resulting strategies of poaching and piracy of the sciences by humanities
scholars will likely not land well with those trained within the psychological
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sciences, for example, who know that any theory or concept exists within
complex circuits of contestation, contradictory experimental evidence, anoma-
lies, puzzles and contrary interpretation, often shaped by specific allegiances and
forms of training. Thus refraction or ‘creative contagion’ as a form of reparative
reading might not open up the kind of interdisciplinarity or rapprochement
perhaps needed by both the humanities and the sciences in affect theory. As
Reicher (2001) has said in relation to contagion theory, or what is more
commonly known within psychology as crowd psychology, it is largely a ‘theory
without a referant’. What we find are a dispersion of theories and competing
explanations within contemporary experimental social psychology built on
specific ideological assumptions made about the working classes at the turn of
the twentieth century (also see Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001). These assump-
tions were popularised by Gustave Le Bon’s (1922) treatise on the crowd, The
Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, that influenced mass (fascist) politics, early
media studies, and how contagion primarily became explained and understood
within the psychological sciences (Blackman, 2012).
Reicher engages with contagion theory in the present as a social psychologist
who trained with the social identity theorist Henri Tajfel. Social identity theory
was an attempt to displace the individual–social dualism that for many critical
psychologists has plagued psychology and prevented it from addressing the
fundamental relationality of psychological processes. This work has a lineage to
discursive and critical psychology, paving the way for explorations of how
psychological processes are constituted through talk and discursive practices
(see Potter and Wetherell, 1996). Although this work was considered by many
to be overly cognitivist, the emphasis on social action and the accomplishment
and emergence of subjectivities through practice has its place within contem-
porary affect theory (see Wetherell, 2012). Reicher (2001) importantly also
recognises how scholars outside of psychology (particularly historians such as
E.P. Thompson), have provided convincing theories of action, change and
transformation, and links social identity theory to the importance of context,
ideology and practice found in this writing. He argues that the legacy of Le Bon
underpins the way in which contagion, refigured as ‘social influence’ is
implicitly approached within contemporary experimental social psychology.
This is despite the fact that Le Bon’s theories are and have been largely
discredited. He reads and evaluates these traditions through his own commit-
ments to social identity theory, investing the gaps, contradictions, conflicting
evidence and experimental apparatuses with the possibilities and assumptions
of his own theoretical investments; what we might recognise as an empirical
approach to experimental evidence typical of the discipline. Reicher presents
social identity theory as a theory of social action which can potentially resolve
and convincingly explain contagious processes.3
Reicher’s strategy of reading psychology is to show Le Bon’s legacy in what
took form within post-WWII experimental social psychology, particularly in the
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traditions of work on conformity and obedience associated with Ash, Festinger,
Milgram, Zimbardo and Sherif. At least some of these social psychologists will be
familiar to non-psychologists as their theories and experimental practices have
travelled across media and science, being both influenced by and influencing
reality TV formats (see MaCarthy, 2009; Brown, 2012). To that extent histories
of exchange and collaboration are integral to scientific forms of experimental
culture and these movements and circulations always already exceed the
assumption that rapprochement is necessarily about increasing intimacy, famil-
iarity and knowledge of science by humanities scholars. This inevitably results in
the kinds of cherry-picking of specific theories, concepts and experimental
evidence by humanities scholars and underpins some of the critiques of affect
theory that have been well-rehearsed by many (Papoulias and Callard, 2010;
Leys, 2011; Wetherell, 2012).
In the remainder of this article I want to propose a different strategy of
reparative reading/rapprochement that is influenced by an early minor archive
of psychological experimentation in the area of automaticity that has largely
been forgotten within psychology. My approach to reading and engaging this
archive in the present is primarily genealogical inflected through hauntology
(see Derrida, 2004; Barad, 2010). I explore the traces of what could have been
if psychology had adopted an analytics of experimentation that was more
attuned to the processual, indeterminate, entangled technical-material-
affective agencies that cannot be reduced to psychological capacities relating
to distinctly bounded human subjects. The approach to science and experi-
mentation enacted within this archive is one that has been described as ‘radical
empiricist’ rather than empirical (see Meyer, 2001). Radical empiricism
associated primarily with William James refused the idea that knowledge was
knowledge about fixed objects or entities. Rather experience was always
experience of relations, where there was no ‘inside’ of psychological experience
that pre-existed the experience of relations (which were indeterminate and
contingent).4 This distinction and its importance in opening up what I am
calling the lost-futures of psychology and is one that has much to offer both the
humanities and sciences, and is more faithful to the commitment to process,
vitalism, movement, becoming, relationality and indeterminancy found within
the field of affect theory than might be found within the contemporary
cognitive, neuro and psychological sciences. I argue that this minor archive
acts as an interesting precursor to more performative approaches to experi-
mentation found in STS and some queer and feminist approaches, including the
seminal work of Barad (2007).5 This archive lingers at the margins of early
psychological experimentation in the late nineteenth century and is marked by
a close relationship between psychic and psychological research (see Valentine,
2012). This includes early psychological experiments on automaticities using
the technique of automatic writing derived from experiments with psychic
phenomena.
Blackman
368 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 7, 4, 362–384
The experiments I am particularly interested in were carried out by Gertrude
Stein and Leon Solomons, under the tutelage of Hugo Munsterberg at William
James’ Harvard Psychological Laboratory in the late nineteenth century. I argue
that this psychological archive and the way in which it has taken form in the
present is also instructive for thinking through the problematic of power,
subjectivity and affectivity. I will argue it offers up some radical ways of
theorising affectivity as a historical counterpoint to those which have become
part of mainstream psychological theorising in the present. The disjuncture
between this archive and what took form as psychology engaged in processes of
professionalisation throughout the early twentieth century, offer an interesting
challenge to some of the ways psychological concepts, theories and figures have
been adopted and taken up within contemporary cultural theory. The legacy of
this archive in a modified form has found its way into contemporary cognitive
science and studies of priming and automaticity, but operates according to a
rather different ‘social technology’ (Brown, 2012). The best way to illustrate my
argument is to take the reader back to early psychology, where the traces of what
could have been and might become can be found.
Queer Science – Gertrude Stein and Automatic Writing
Before becoming a significant and celebrated modernist experimental writer,
Gertrude Stein studied a degree in psychology at Harvard with William James.
Stein became interested in the question of what it means to designate a process
automatic, such as writing, for example, and was in conversation with William
James’ reflections on the undivided nature of experience in his lectures that took
place while she studied between 1895 and 1897. She disagreed with William
James and with her co-experimenter Leon Solomons who equated automaticity
to distraction; a (writing) process seen to occur without conscious thought or
attention (see Meyer, 2001). Perhaps Stein’s disagreement might be considered
distinctly feminist as the attribution of automaticity to certain experiences, such
as hysteria, contributed to the assumption that women were less capable of
engaging will and therefore more suggestible and susceptible to others. This was
an assumption embedded within biological psychiatry of the time, which equated
mental ill-health to degeneracy of the will (Blackman, 2001). As Stein argued in
relation to her subsequent modernist writing practice, she objected to the
characterisation of any of her writing as automatic because of the close links
made between female hysteria, automaticity and loss of control to an abnormal
secondary personality (Meyer, 2001). Stein was right to be sceptical because as
the reader will be aware already, the politics of will and automaticity were not
simply psychological categories of mind, but adjudications of worth, value and
status (also see Ahmed, 2014). Despite her own scepticism about the nature of
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automatic writing and the distinction between consciousness and non or
secondary consciousness that were part of the experimental a priori, Stein’s
theoretical resistances reveal something much more interesting about the recruit-
ment and enrolment of subjectivity within the experimental apparatus.
Stein took up the position of a knowing, interested experimental subject, who
through training, discipline and choreography was able at times to feel as if she
was being directed or governed by an imperceptible force or agency, or even by a
secondary personality (see Solomons and Stein, 1896). This did not take place
through deception by the experimenter (a feature of contemporary forms of
experimentation within social psychology and cognitive science), or not knowing
the parameters of the experiment. Rather it required her to engage in certain
processes of transformation by attuning to what it might be possible to achieve
through actively engaging with the affordances of the experimental apparatus.
The clues to the efficacy of the experiment come when we consider the labour,
effort, concentration and practice that enabled Stein to experience her own arm
moving and writing as if it was a so-called foreign will. Meyer (2001) emphasises
the paradoxes of automaticity in this context by referring to Stein’s achievements
as examples of non-automatic writing; a reflection she also later made. The
description of the practice as non-automatic confounded any easy distinction
between consciousness and unconsciousness, will or automaticity and I think
point to something very important in the analytics of experimentation that Stein
was helping to shape (and arguably went on to develop within writing and
literature rather than psychology).
Solomons and Stein adapted a device known as a planchette from psychic
research used by psychic researchers to investigate what were considered supra-
normal experiences, such as spirit communications. A planchette was a metal ball
supporting a round glass disk with a rod on which a pen or pencil could be
attached. If a person held the pen or pencil the planchette would move around,
creating particular motor rhythms or automatisms because of its rolling move-
ments. The device required the participation of a human subject (usually Stein
herself) who would engage in certain practices, such as reading a novel, while at
the same time attach her other hand to the pencil/pen. This novel practice of
divided attention (reading while conjoining the hand with a device that would
produce rolling movements) allowed for an experience of doubleness that could
be attuned to, extended, modulated and explored within different experimental
parameters. There are many permutations of these experiments where they were
populated by different actors and agencies, which included a dictator (playing
with different frequencies of sound and speed), novels (of different emotional
intensities), fragments of remembered poetry, as well as different embodied
experiences (of fatigue, restlessness, absorption, distraction and so forth).
Perhaps Stein’s interest in this apparatus was carried by her developing interest
in writing and the experience of absorption that often accompanies reading and
writing, but whatever the motivation Stein decided she would be the ideal
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experimental subject to undertake the series of experiments. Her capacity to offer
herself as an ‘embodied instrument’ (Martin, 2013) would involve periods of
training, discipline and choreography (a training that was formulated as over-
coming the actions of will and certain habits of attention or what she also termed
the limits of the willing subject). Through attending to and transforming specific
thresholds of sound, labour and attention, Stein was able to experience her arm
moving and writing as an extra-personal entity – as not-me; what she equated to
a ‘feeling of extra-personality’ (p. 495). These forms of motor automatisms
were equated by Stein to a process of becoming unconscious and reveals the more
transitive and processual approach to what was designated psychological at the
time. Importantly, Stein’s subjectivity was central to the experimental apparatus
and her capacity to affect and be affected by the apparatus was crucial to its
efficacy and the effects that were produced. It is interesting that this experience
was difficult for other experimental subjects to replicate, perhaps one reason why
it has not become a classic psychology experiment!
Why might these experiments be of interest to contemporary affect theorists
engaging with psychology and specifically the area of automaticity research? First
I argue that they operate according to an analytics of experimentation that is neither
positivist or empirical. They were not trying to prove the nature of automaticity but
rather explore the efficacy of the apparatus itself (which includes the experimental
subject) to enact certain phenomenological, epistemic and aesthetic effects. The
reflections on the efficacy of the apparatus include reflections on what it was possible
to actualise under specific conditions. The effects are not decipherable or measurable
by psychometric tests or the visual gaze of a detached experimenter, as they rely on
the experimental subject coming out of the process changed (and experiencing that
process of transformation as other-directed). This experience is not equated (at least
by Stein) to the triggering of a process separate from consciousness or will, but rather
to the experience of an entanglement of processes – material, technical, semiotic,
immaterial –which are related to a process of becoming unconscious. This process is
marked by the focused exploration of specific thresholds of experience that are
distributed across human and non-human actors, rather than reflections on inner
psychological processes. These entangled processes are considered dynamic, inde-
terminate, fleeting and related to distributive forms of agency and capacity. This
distributive agency requires a lot of work; as Stein herself said it ‘required a great
deal of concentrated attention’ (Meyer, 2001, p. 231), as well as ingenuity, effort,
commitment and sensitivities to what might be possible.
Towards an Analytics of Experimentation
What is striking about these early psychological experiments, when compared
with the positivist empiricism of contemporary psychology, is that they did not
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operate according to an analytics of experimentation concerned with verifying
particular theories or concepts. They were not so much concerned with proving
or disproving hypotheses concerning the nature of hysteria, for example, but
rather with how particular phenomenological experiences or epistemic or
aesthetic events could be produced and enacted within the laboratory. They
were akin to material-semiotic events, and became open to a range of competing
concepts used to decipher and interpret the significance of the experiments. This
of course includes my own subsequent interpretation of the experiments. In that
sense, they exist as an interesting forerunner to contemporary debates on the
performativity of experimentation, which we find in the work of Barad (2007)
and others (see Despret, 2008) who have explored meaningful and even creative
experimentation as a set of obligations, affordances and sensitivities to the
experimental subject or object under investigation; human and non-human.
This more performative logic, what I am going to call following Schmidgen
(2005) – an epistemology of analytic experimentation – is one that affect
theorists have not adequately explored, either within the humanities or the
sciences. This is perhaps an area of interdisciplinary enquiry that offers the
possibility of invention and creativity, holding up the potential for the develop-
ment of new methods, forms of practice and strategies of reading and engaging
with scientific and non-scientific theories. Although these comments are
speculative they extend arguments that have already been made by critical
psychologists, such as Brown (2012), who have been influenced by STS, process
and vitalist philosophies and affect theory.
Brown (ibid.) argues that rather than see psychological forms of experimenta-
tion as reductive, we might instead explore the layered and contingent histories
which organise different experimental traditions. His focus is on post-WWII
social psychology and particularly the traditions associated with Milgram and
Zimbardo, who were both influenced by reality TV (specifically the creator of
Candid Camera – Allan Funt), and went on to influence contemporary reality TV
formats such as Big Brother, for example. He argues that these forms of
experimentation are related to specific dispositifs or ensembles and arrangements
of forces or relations, that draw an equivalence with the dramatic theatre of
Bertold Brecht, as well as abstract expressionist art. These are consolidated for
Brown in terms of the shared experimental cultures and practices (or devices),
which he terms ‘abstract experimentalism’. Brown is influenced by Stengers
(1997) and Despret (2004) who have taken psychological forms of experimenta-
tion as objects of investigation (specifically Milgram and the case of Clever Hans,
for example), but departs from their evaluation of these forms as primarily
impoverished; as not bringing about anything new and therefore inventive.
As Despret (2004) has argued in relation to the psychological interpretation of
Clever Hans the horse at the turn of the twentieth century, for example, the
potential of this controversy is reduced to and replaced by ‘the most impover-
ished version of Hans’ marvellous story’ (p. 121).
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In relation to these arguments and their obvious tensions, I want to return to
the problematic of subjectivity and reflect on the place of subjectivity within
different forms of psychological experimentation. This will allow me to speak
to some assumptions that are being made within cultural theory and philoso-
phy concerning subjectivity and its eradication from theorising as a redundant
and even obsolete concept. For example, there is a trend among some
contemporary researchers interested in non-human agencies to increasingly
draw an equivalence between the human and non-human. This includes
speculative realism and object-oriented ontologies, where a focus on non-
human agencies often displaces the centrality of the human altogether. For
example, speculative realism or philosophy is framed as allowing objects to
exist aside from the interpretative frameworks that might be brought to bear
on them. This flat ontology, where distinctions between subject and object are
not only displaced, but the potential anthropocentrism of the human subject is
eradicated is one that is gaining popularity across the arts and humanities.
Although these arguments are important for re-qualifying the status of the
human, and for distributing agency among human and non-human actors, the
rush to dismiss subjectivity seems premature. When subjectivity is still retained
as important for analyses, as with Sampson’s (2012) work, for example, the
more transitive approaches to subjectivity are often ‘fleshed out’ by some
recourse to the neurosciences or a neuro-physiological body (brain). This is
a growing trend within an area known as ‘new materialist’ philosophy, for
example, which is gaining ground within media and cultural theory for
analysing the place of the subject within biopolitical analyses of mediation
(see Parikka, 2012; Valiho, 2014). Within the context of affect theory, for
example, many argue that this presents a ‘crisis of the phenomenological,
experiencing human subject’ (Parikka, ibid, p. 84). On the basis of this
assumption the phenomenologically experiencing subject is replaced by brain
or body, underpinned by a variety of neurophysiological concepts (including
distinctions made between will and automaticity). Subjectivity is replaced with
the somatic, which easily reduces to the neuro-physiological aligned to
concepts such as the automatic, the subpersonal, the pre-programmed, the
non-conscious and non-cognitive.
In order to explore the tensions in these trends I will turn now to an area of
cognitive science, which is often used to authenticate these claims – studies of
reaction time. We will see that the problematic of subjectivity becomes much
more vexed and complicated when we consider some of the different experi-
mental traditions which converge in relation to this problem. What we will see
are some of the displaced histories and submerged potentialities which are
carried by different experimental cultures and practices. The tensions and
anomalies do not displace subjectivity, but rather bring the problematic to the
foreground. I will then draw a link back to the Stein experiments and draw a
provisional conclusion.
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Libet’s Reaction Time Experiments Revisited
One account of automaticity that has been brought into cultural theory and
become invoked as an account of affective processes draws from cognitive science
and specifically the reaction-time experiments carried out by Libet et al (1983).
These experiments have been used to authenticate what has come to be known
within affect theory as the ‘half-second delay’ between thinking and action (see
Thrift, 2007). As Leys (2011, p. 454) argues, these experiments have been taken
up across the humanities ‘to prove’ that ‘material processes of the body-brain
generate our thoughts and that conscious thought, or intention’, arrives after a
‘half-second delay’. Libet and his associates published the article based on their
studies in the journal, Brain. They assumed that they were exploring ‘free will’ or
intentionality and that this had been done by measuring what is known as
‘readiness potential’ (RP). They used electrodes that were placed on six college
students scalps and asked the students to engage in certain tasks and activities, or
to elicit voluntary actions in a spontaneous manner; spontaneity was of course
circumscribed by the parameters of the experiment.6 They were able to measure
the activation of brain processes several 100 milliseconds before the experimental
subjects performed particular acts, and on this basis they concluded that ‘the
brain decides to act before awareness of, or conscious initiation of that act’ (Rose
and Abi-Rached, 2013). This has become known as the half-second delay
between thought and action, or even cognition and affect. This a priori, which
as Rose and Abi-Rached (ibid.) argue is ‘alive and well’ (p. 211) in the
neurosciences, has also taken on an after-life within affect theory. On this basis
it has almost become a truism that if you want to analyse subjectivity in the
context of affect the neurosciences hold the answers.
I want to turn now to an area of automaticity research which has a lineage with
the Stein experiments and which has retained her interest in how subjectivity
enters into or might enter into the experimental apparatus. This work does not
reduce subjectivity to the singularly bound experiencing phenomenological
subject but rather works with a more relational account of subjectivity. This
tradition of work is known as the phenomenology of authorship; that is, how,
when and why subjects feel a sense of authorship within processes of co-enaction
and co-constitution. That is, rather than adjudicate between intentionality and
non-intentionality as discrete psychological processes, the question is directed to
why and how subject’s determine authorship and what this feels like when the
subject is not considered rational and autonomous, but rather understood to be
part of a distributed system of co-enaction, which includes human and non-
human actors and agencies.
This philosophy of mind, or philosophy of extended mind (Clark, 2008)
considers cognition as embedded, extended, enacted and embodied, (what is
often referred to as the 4E’s), and is central to the approach of the late cognitive
scientist Daniel Wegner and his colleagues. It has also been a source of inspiration
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for some cultural theorists and philosophers, such as Protevi (2009), who recognise
that going beneath, below or bypassing the subject when analysing affectivity is
ultimately reductionist, unless you also consider the relations between power,
subjectification and subjectivity – what he terms the alongside and above of
political affect. Libet’s reaction-time experiments, and how we might decipher the
effects produced, are central to debates surrounding the phenomenology of
authorship, and show that the assumption that affect precedes cognition (the so-
called half-second delay), and how we might interpret this is still very much an
open controversy. I very partially review some of these debates below, not because
I think they have the ‘correct’ theory of automaticity, but I am more interested in
how the vestiges of the Stein experiments are carried through within these
experimental practices or devices (Brown, 2012). There are of course distinct
differences and these will also be discussed and conclusions will be drawn.
Ebert and Wegner (2011) argue that Libet’s reaction-time experiments were
not simply measures of reaction time or RP as they have been interpreted and
understood by many, including many affect theorists. Ebert and Wegner (ibid.)
argue that the experimental subject was not enroled into the experiment solely as
a neuro-physiological subject (despite Libet et al’s assumptions). Rather the
subject was also recruited into the experiment as a phenomenologially experien-
cing subject; one required within the parameters of the experiment to engage in
practices of reflexive attention and specifically asked to judge and provide a
coherent account of their own experience of agency or conscious will. In short,
Ebert and Wegner (ibid.) argue that Libet’s participants had an experience of
‘conscious will’ that was produced by the experimental apparatus and has not
been adequately taken into account in subsequent interpretations of the signifi-
cance and implications of the studies. To that extent, they argue that the
experiments primed the subjects where the instruction to judge reaction time
worked to produce a delay between stimulus and perceived response, which itself
was an artifact of the instruction. They argue, rather controversially, that the
experiments do not tell us about reaction time per se, but about the vagaries of
‘self-reported authorship’. To that extent these experiments are argued to be part
of a ‘time-judgement paradigm’ (p. 138) rather than measures of reaction time.
In other words, that ‘conscious will can be experienced that does not correspond
to causation’ (Wegner, 2003, p. 65). And of course, this is a common and norma-
tive response to subjectification in (neo-liberal) subjects, who have primarily been
produced to believe that they are predominantly autonomous, rational, conscious
agents; what Bargh and Morsella (2008) in a related context terms a ‘conscious-
centric bias’ (p. 73). This contestation of the original experiments and their
significance relates the delay between action and thought to an inference that
subjects would have held that thought causes action. It is suggested that what
they were actually reporting on was how this inference can be confounded and
modulated within particular experimental practices. As Bargh (ibid.) suggests,
people are not very good at reporting on the ways in which their thought, action,
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feeling and beliefs are modulated and this is primarily what these experiments
demonstrate. Importantly he suggests that we need to go outside of psychology to
understand this. This is perhaps an opening and invitation that cultural theorists
and affect scholars ought to heed.
Leys (ibid.) also suggests that the interpretation of the experiments by some
affect theorists sets up a ‘false dichotomy between mind and matter’ (p. 457).
I want to extend these critiques by situating Libet’s reaction-time experiments
within a longer history. This history, following Schmidgen (2005), might also be
considered a history of ‘machines’; of what he calls ‘those spatially circumscribed
and temporarily limited installations that connect a vast number of heteroge-
neous components: partial objects derived from the experimenter and the
experimental subject (eyes, hands, voices, etc), more or less isolated organs
(hearts, lungs, muscles, nerves, etc), energy sources, styli, sooted paper, tables,
notes and publications’ (p. 211). In this context Schmidgen analyses the Donders
Machine, a specific material-semiotic apparatus which physiologists used in the
nineteenth century to measure the speed of excitation within nerves, producing all
kinds of ‘epistemic’ and even aesthetic effects. Schmidgen develops the concept of
the experiment as a machinic apparatus via the work of Deleuze and Guattari and
particularly the assumption that subjectivity is transversal; that is that technolo-
gies and bodies are ‘always component parts of each other’ (p. 216 – a view that
he also credits to the work of Donna Haraway). Schmidgen’s analysis of
experiments as histories of machines is an attempt to bring the body back into
discussions of experiments as particular cultures and forms of practices.
Reaction-Time Experiments and the Machinic-Body
What is striking about these early forms of psychological experimentation on
reaction time is the rather materialist body that is recruited and articulated by the
experimental apparatus. Schmidgen recognises that the human body, as it was
articulated by the apparatus, offered ‘itself for an almost infinite number of
experimental variations’ (p. 221), but that the body was very much conceived as a
rather flat organic body, connected and restricted by neurophysiological mea-
sures (galvanic skin response, heart-rate, temperature and so forth). This created
a separation and distinction between the physiological and the psychological
(viewed as an autonomous realm), engendered he suggests by the machinic
practices of the experimental apparatus ‘based on its own practice of intensities’
(p. 231). Thus the body was produced and enacted as an anatomical and
physiological entity, helping to engender a split between the physiological and
psychological, which as we have seen endures to this day. One of the implications
of this approach to machinic apparatuses, which as Schmidgen also argues, is
common to other machines, such as cinema and other media, is that bodies do not
Blackman
376 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 7, 4, 362–384
pre-exist the experimental apparatus, but are recruited and enacted in particular
ways – what he terms, following Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘becoming of a body’
(p. 231). Although this assumption is central to a long tradition of feminist work
and work within STS and related perspectives, it has not been followed through
sufficiently within work on affect, which often relies on an under-recognised logic
of positivist experimentation, despite its commitments to process and movement.
The contemporary area of automaticity research, with all its anomalies,
controversies, contestations and puzzles, retains an interest in how we can be
moved and made to move by our conjoining with human and non-human others.
This a priori has a long history, which takes psychology back to its close links to
psychic research (also see Andriopoulos, 2008). This is perhaps disclosed by the
range and diversity of phenomena that are brought together and specified as part
of automaticities reach. These include phenomena such as table-turning, tapping
and tilting (associated with the nineteenth century medium), ouija board spelling,
dowsing or divining, facilitated communication, hypnotic suggestion, trance
states, voice hearing, motor automatisms (this includes involuntary muscular
movements), through to actions, thoughts and feelings seen to be produced as a
result of priming. This might include so-called yielding to media forms and
practices. The concept of priming relates to a variety of techniques used to
modulate thought, action, belief and feeling, such that people arguably can be
made to do things that they experience as being consciously willed, or conversely
to experience a sense of un-willed action, which confounds their own sense of
agency and control (Moore et al, 2009). So-called unwilled action relate to what
Ansfield andWegner (1996) term ‘actions that are so remarkably divorced from a
feeling of doing’ (p. 483) that they are often attributed to supernatural forces.
People often feel as if they are directed by someone or something else; actions or
feelings are not experienced as phenomenologically willed. They do not have a
conscious sense of acting or what is often termed phenomenal will.
However, one distinct difference between contemporary automaticity research
and Stein’s automatic writing experiments concerns the place of the subject or
subjectivity within the experimental apparatus. In contemporary automaticity
research, subjects are primarily deceived as to the real aims of the experiment,
and de-briefing after the experiments often involves determining whether subjects
were actually aware and therefore influenced by what are termed ‘experimenter
expectations’ (see Shanks et al, 2013). The potential to be actively involved in the
processes of modulation that are afforded by different experimental apparatuses
is foreclosed from the outset. As with post-world war II social psychology, the
experimental culture is one where the ideal experimental subject is largely
unaware of the unfolding drama, where the experimenter plays an executive role,
and where there are various cover stories, confederates, props and pranks to
ensure that this is accomplished (see Brown, 2012). The prehistory of these
experiments and the very different social technology from those which organised
the Stein experiments is notable in this respect. Stein was perhaps a very wilful
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subject (Ahmed, 2014). She refused the attribution of automaticity to the
automatic and saw herself as an active participant in processes of modulation.
Her own reflections on the difficulties, challenges and experiences of these
processes were not internalised within her own psychological processes.
She rather reflected on the different intensities afforded by the capacity of the
apparatus to hold together and allow herself to articulate and be articulated by
different component ormachinic relations. In that sense I argue that her approach
was more ‘radical empiricist’ than empirical, reflecting an assumption of
transversal subjectivity more attuned to the process philosophies and vitalism
that she was steeped in (see Meyer, 2001). This is perhaps something that we
might recognise now in modernist traditions of writing, which pay attention and
attune to the potentialities and possibities of the materiality of language in all its
combinatory forms. Stein was perhaps the ideal post-human or ‘post-human
phenomenological subject’, in that her approach to experience was not bound by
a discrete psychological subject. As we have seen this assumption is retained in
some areas of automaticity research and could usefully be extended.
As Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) have argued in their recent book, Neuro: The
New Brain Sciences and the Management of Mind, there are certain debates,
problematics and modalities of experimental practice within the neurosciences,
which create opportunities for collaboration across the humanities and neuros-
ciences. In the context of cognitive neuroscience, research on automaticity seems
to me to pro-offer such an opportunity for a shared venture. Prominent
humanities scholars interested in diverse practices, including social media,
contagious forms of communication, image-making, ‘viral’ forms of advertising
and marketing, and what has generally been subsumed within the ‘turn to affect’
across the humanities have drawn on the concept of automaticity, often with little
awareness of its specific histories of contestation, debate and legitimation within
the sciences. This leads to the rich and complex histories of automaticity and
experimental practices within the sciences being ignored. When science is
engaged, it is generally a very narrow, reductionist and problematic engagement
with the neurosciences.
As Rose (2013) suggests in a recent article in Theory, Culture & Society, there
is a new openness of the sciences to the humanities, made possible by the
neuromolecular gaze, epi-genetics and the plastic and social brain, and there is
the opportunity for some kind of rapprochement. There are, however, other areas
of cognitive science and experimental social psychology that exceed the neuro-
molecular gaze, and these areas also offer the potential for interdisciplinary
engagement. As I hope I have convinced any rapprochement or reparative
reading must also include more critical reflection and attention to the ontologies
of subjectivity that are produced, recruited and enacted via different forms of
experimentation. To that extent, the turn to affect is not a turn away from the
subject and makes the problematic of subjectivity more urgent and not less
important. As I have argued in my recent book, Immaterial Bodies: Affect,
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Embodiment, Mediation (Blackman, 2012) neuroscientists such as Damasio who
have provided many affect theorists with neuro-physiological concepts for
exploring non-conscious processes, also rely on minimal, often under-explored
theories of subjectivity to make their claims. These proto-theories of the self are
rarely examined and the problematic of subjectivity haunts such claims.
Automaticity is a concept then, which links the arts, humanities and sciences,
has an important historical past, and is one that I am calling, following the
important work of the biologist and science studies scholar Rheinberger (1994), an
‘epistemic thing’. He uses this term to refer to entities that escape fixation, and
where there is always more to be said than any experimenter at any given moment
is trying to tell. There are what Rheinberger terms submerged narratives, repres-
sions, displacements and excesses, which create alternative directions, contributing
to the potential dyanamism of science. As he argues, ‘experimental systems contain
remnants of older narratives as well as fragments of narratives that have not yet
been told’ (p. 77). This potentially opens up the possibility of the experimental
system ‘becoming different’, that is attending to and reflecting on its histories and
conditions of emergence, and remaining young; this is a term that Rhineberger uses
to refer to the capacity of experimental systems to produce differences. I am
interested in those differences which continually defy the language of neurophy-
siological reductionism and which open experimental systems up to traces of the
past. Automaticity takes us back to a time when transdisciplinary enquiry and
experimentation was commonplace, indeed institutionalized, and where concepts
travelled across borders and boundaries blurring the lines between art, science and
culture. This archive of ‘queer science’, characteristic of science, arts and
humanities research and theorising in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, brought together philosophers, artists, scientists, literary theorists,
economists and physicists, for example, who were united in their focus on and
fascination with hypnotic suggestion, mediumship, telepathy, voice hearing,
automatic writing and so forth, all considered signs of automaticity – that is, signs
that a person could be directed by someone or something else.
Automaticity has travelled as a concept from this early archive and become
dispersed across the arts, humanities and sciences, taking on an increasing
visibility within the contemporary ‘turn to affect’, directing attention to forms of
perception, knowing and sense-making, which are primarily considered non-
conscious, non-cognitive, non-representational, shareable, trans-subjective, col-
lective and operating as thresholds or conversion points. Automaticity also
brings together cognitive and neuroscientists within the present, and circulates
across distinct yet interrelated traditions, concerned with how brains, minds and
worlds connect to produce experiences of automaticity that unsettle some of the
assumptions and concepts that have become rather black-boxed within the
psychological and neurosciences; will, consciousness and intention, for example.
Although this research primarily comes from the psychological sciences and
particularly the cognitive neurosciences, the concepts that are deployed travel
Affect and automaticy
379© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 7, 4, 362–384
across and within media and cultural theory, as well as perhaps lying behind
some of the new ways of imagining our relationship to mediation, or what Grusin
(2010) terms mediality (combining approaches to mediation with specific under-
standings of affectivity, for example). Automaticity deserves attention and is an
area which would benefit from collaboration across the humanities and sciences.
The turn to affect therefore does seem to be one area that holds such a promise.
Towards a Conclusion
Many affect theorists have focused attention on how affect does not require a
(human) subject to take form, focusing on transmission across space and time
through a Deleuzian topology of the virtual/actual and the biomediated body
(see Clough, 2008). Despite these moves I want to retain the place for a
radically transformed subject within such discussions. The trans-subjective
ontology of subjectivity, which underpins work on automaticity, rather than
displacing the human, brings questions of ‘post-human phenomenology’ to
the foreground in ways that I argue have not been displaced. Although the
‘alongside’ and above are recognised as important processes of affectivity, the
‘below’ has itself become somewhat stuck within particular traditions and
paradigms for exploring and theorising subjectivity. In the spirit of the way
Silvan Tomkins’ theories were taken up by Eve Kokofsky Sedgwick (2003)
who she suggests was a psychologist who was ‘sublimely resistant’ to core
psychological assumptions,7 I want to remain open to other resistant ways of
modelling subjectivity which are still of interest. And of course, the dynamism
of science, as much as cultural theory, must surely be in exploring and
inventing new models or modelisations of subjectivity, which allow radical
and creative forms of experimentation to take shape.
Work on automaticity refigured within the context of affect studies is one area
that has the potential to allow imaginative work on subjectivity to be enacted
and transformed. It could open up rather than close down the question of the
ontological status of affect within current formulations. Surely this is a
direction to pursue if only to breathe life into debates, which are fast in danger
of becoming limited by academic defence and posturing. The focus on more
controversial areas within the sciences (including what I am terming Queer
Science) might also open up our own research to more creative experimenta-
tion with method, attuning to what it might be possible to produce, perform
and enact in our own research. The more performative strategy to experi-
mentation that I am advocating is something that clearly haunts scientific
experimentation in relation to automaticity in the present. It is one that we
would be wise to acknowledge in our own potential engagements with the
neurosciences and beyond.
Blackman
380 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 7, 4, 362–384
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the reviewers, Matt Fuller, Gregory Seigworth and Margie
Wetherell for useful comments on the original paper. The paper is much better for
their critical engagement.
About the Author
Lisa Blackman is a Professor in the Department of Media and Communications,
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. She works at the intersection of body
studies and media and cultural theory. She is the editor of the journal Body &
Society (Sage) and co-editor of Subjectivity (with Valerie Walkerdine, Palgrave
Macmillan). She has published four books: Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodi-
ment, Mediation (2012, Sage/TCS); The Body: The Key Concepts (2008, Berg);
Hearing Voices: Embodiment and Experience (2001, Free Association Books);
Mass Hysteria: Critical Psychology and Media Studies (with Valerie Walkerdine,
2001, Palgrave Macmillan). She teaches courses which span critical media
psychology, affect studies, embodiment and body studies, and experimentation
in the context of art/science. She is particularly interested in phenomena which
have puzzled scientists, artists, literary writers and the popular imagination for
centuries, including automaticity, voice hearing, suggestion and telepathy. She is
currently working on a new project Haunted Data: Social Media, Queer Science
and Archives of the Future.
Notes
1 See The Fibreculture Journal, ‘Exploring Affect in Interaction Design, Interaction based art and Digital
art’, Issue, 21 edited by Jonas Fritsche and Thomas Markussen (December, 2012).
2 Tarde influenced the work of Deleuze and Latour and there is now a sizeable scholarship on his
significance for contemporary cultural theory. This includes an edited collected by Candea (2010) and
a special issue of the journal Economy and Society in 2007 edited by Andrew Barry and Nigel Thrift.
3 See Haslam and Reicher’s 2009 article published in Scientific Mind, ‘The Psychology of Tyranny’,
which makes a case for the relevance of social identity theory in the context of explaining
genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing’, the abuse of Iraqui prisoners in Abu Ghraib and suicide bombing, for
example.
4 There is also a lineage from this to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to perception. I do
not have the time in this article to explore this connection but thank you to Valerie Walkerdine for
pointing this out.
5 Karen Barad’s work has been hugely influential across the humanities, extending Judith Butler’s
concept of performativity in relation to the liveliness of matter and post-human agencies. She is often
cited as one of the founders of new materialist philosophy, although it is unclear whether she would
use this term to describe her own approach.
6 For a useful description and extended discussion of the experiments see Rose and Abi-Rached (2013).
7 This would not be the view of many trained within critical approaches to psychology.
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